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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT-CRIMINAL LAW-PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN NON-
CAPITAL SENTENCING-The United States Supreme Court has held
that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed in ac-
cordance with a state recidivist statute on a defendant after his
seventh non-violent felony conviction constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment.
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
Jerry Buckley Helm, 36, was indicted in 1979 by the state of
South Dakota for having written a "no account" check in the
amount of $100.' Helm pled guilty, waived his right to a prelimi-
nary hearing, rejected a presentence investigation and insisted on
being sentenced without delay.2 It was the seventh felony convic-
tion for Helm, who had earlier been convicted three times for
third-degree burglary,3 and one time each for grand larceny,4 ob-
taining money under false pretenses and third-offense driving
1. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3005 (1983). The statute, in relevant part, provided
that:
Any person who, for himself or as an agent or any representative of another for
present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have
an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-41-1.2 (1979). South Dakota law authorizes a maximum pen-
alty of five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary along with a $5,000 fine for a Class
5 felony. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1983).
2. State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 498 (S.D. 1980).
3. 103 S. Ct. at 3004. Helm's convictions for third-degree burglary occurred in 1964,
1966 and 1969. Id. Third degree burglary consisted of "breaking or entering at any time into
any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof ... or
any structure or erection in which property is kept, with an intent to commit larceny or any
felony. . . ." S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). The punishment
was up to 15 years imprisonment. S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 22-32-10 (1967) (repealed 1976).
The definitions for third-degree burglary in 1964 and 1966 were essentially the same. 103 S.
Ct. at 3004 n.1.
4. 103 S. Ct. at 3004. The conviction occurred in 1972 and the maximum punishment
was three years in the state penitentiary or one year in the county jail or a fine three times
the value of the property obtained. Id. at 3004 & n.2. See S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 22-41-4
(1967) (repealed 1976).
5. 103 S. Ct. at 3004. At the time, larceny was defined as taking property by stealth or
fraud with the intent to deprive another thereof. S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 22-37-1 (1967)
(repealed 1976). Grand larceny was committed if the property had a value exceeding $50,
was taken from the person of another, or was livestock. S.D. Com. LAWS ANN. § 22-37-2
(1967) (repealed 1976). Grand larceny was punishable by maximum terms of 10 years in the
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while intoxicated.' The trial judge, in accordance with South Da-
kota's recidivist statute, sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
without parole.8
The sentence was affirmed in 1980 by the South Dakota Su-
preme Court, which held, in part, that the sentence did not consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment.0 Two years later, Helm peti-
tioned the governor of South Dakota for commutation of his
sentence and was turned down." Helm then petitioned for habeas
corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota." The district court, in a memorandum opinion,
held that the sentence, while harsh, did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Rummel v. Estelle," which was found to be control-
ling.18 In Rummel, the Court held that the recidivist statute of
Texas, which allowed for the imposition of a life sentence with the
possibility of parole upon a defendant's third felony conviction, did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.
1 4
Upon denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Helm
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit which reversed and remanded with directions to issue the writ
state penitentiary or one year in the county jail. S.D. Comnp. LAWS ANN. § 22-37-3 (1967)
(repealed 1976).
6. 103 S. Ct. at 3004. Third-offense driving while under the influence of alcohol is a
felony in South Dakota. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-4 (1976). Helm was convicted
under this statute in 1975. 103 S. Ct. at 3004.
7. Normally the crime committed would have called for a sentence of five years in the
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. 103 S. Ct. at 3005. See S.D. Coap. LAWS ANN. § 22-6-
1(6) (1967 & Supp. 1978) (recodified at S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)).
The South Dakota recidivist statute, however, provided that "[wihen a defendant has been
convicted of at least three prior convictions (sic) in addition to the principal felony, the
sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony."
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979). A 1981 amendment specifies that the prior convic-
tions must be felony convictions. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (Supp. 1983).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 3005-06. The sentence for a Class 1 felony is life imprisonment but
South Dakota law provides that a person under life imprisonment "is not eligible for parole
by the board of pardons and paroles." See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1979).
9. 103 S. Ct. at 3006. Helm also raised issues of abuse of the trial judge's discretion
and denial of due process of law. See 287 N.W.2d at 498.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 3006. If the governor had commuted his life sentence to a term of
years, Helm would have been eligible for parole when he had served three-fourths of this
fixed sentence. Id. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 24-15-5(3) (1979).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 3006.
12. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
13. Helm v. Solem, No. 82-5148, (D.S.D. Dec. 2, 1981). The memorandum opinion was
written by Chief Judge Bogue. Id.
14. 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
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of habeas corpus if Helm was not resentenced within sixty days.",
The court of appeals unanimously found that the sentence of life
imprisonment without parole received by Helm was disproportion-
ate to the crimes committed and therefore the sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments.' Based on the decision of the court of ap-
peals, the state of South Dakota petitioned the United States Su-
preme Court for certiorari, which the 'Court granted.' The
Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, 8 that the South Dakota
recidivist statute providing for life imprisonment without parole
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments.' 9
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, first established that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment was
meant to deal with, among other aspects, disproportionate prison
sentencing in non-capital cases. 0 Justice Powell traced the histori-
cal roots of the eighth amendment and proportionality from the
Magna Carta through English Common Law.2" He then explained
that the Court has recognized the proportionality analysis since
Weems v. United States,2 decided in 1910."8 South Dakota had
asserted that felony prison sentences should not be subject to pro-
15. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1982). The opinion was written by
Circuit Judge Bright who was joined by Chief Judge Lay and Circuit Judge Ross. Id. at 582.
16. Id. at 582. In order to so hold, the court of appeals had to distinguish the case at
hand from Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), which it did primarily by distinguishing
between the sentences of life imprisonment with parole and life imprisonment without pa-
role. The court also stated that the Supreme Court in Rummel had not completely rejected
proportionality of sentence review and this review could apply to non-capital as well as
capital offenses. 684 F.2d at 584.
17. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982). Certiorari was granted to consider the eighth
amendment question. Id.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 3004. The majority opinion was written by Justice Powell who was
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackman, and Stevens. Id. The dissent was written
by Chief Justice Burger who was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id. at
3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 3003.
20. Id. at 3006.
21. Id. at 3006-07.
22. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems was convicted for falsifying a public document and
sentenced to cadena temporal for fifteen years. Cadena temporal included hard labor in
chains and the loss of various civil rights and liberties. Among these were the right to con-
trol and dispose inter vivos of his property and the rights of parental and marital authority.
It also included surveillance of the criminal for the rest of his life and the denial of the right
to vote or hold public elective office. Id. at 364.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 3007-08.
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portionality review. 4 Justice Powell rejected this argument, stating
that it would make little sense for the eighth amendment to apply
to bailments and fines at the lower end of the sentencing scale and
to the greatest punishment-death-at the other end, yet exclude
proportionality review of the intermediate punishment of
imprisonment.
2 5
After dealing with the capacity of the Court to pass upon pro-
portionality of sentencing in non-capital cases, the majority
adopted a three-pronged objective test to be used in passing upon
proportionality of sentencing.2 6 The first part of the test examines
and compares the "gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty. 2 7 The majority mentioned several factors which they be-
lieved could be used to determine the gravity of the offense. Pri-
marily, the discussion focused on comparisons which consider the
harm threatened or inflicted on the victim or society and the de-
fendant's degree of culpability. In assessing the harm to the vic-
tim or society, the majority maintained, courts can consider the
magnitude of the crime, whether the crime was Violent or non-vio-
lent, whether the offense was a lesser included offense, whether the
accused was an accomplice or the principal, and whether the crime
was attempted or completed.2 9 In weighing culpability, the major-
ity noted, a court may look to such distinguishing factors as negli-
gent versus intentional conduct and the defendant's motivation in
committing the crime.'s
The second part of the majority's proportionality test consists of
examining "sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction.""1 Here the majority stated that excessiveness might be
found if crimes of a greater severity are penalized to the same or a
lesser degree.
3 2
The third and final part of the test for proportionality review
24. Id. at 3009.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3010. This test for proportionality was rejected by the court in Rummel, but
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, did concede that proportionality review could be
acceptable in exceedingly rare cases. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. One example given was if
a legislature made overtime parking a felony carrying a punishment of life imprisonment.
Id. at 274 n.11.
27. 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
28. Id. at 3011.
29. Id. The court makes it clear that its list of factors is only illustrative of some of the
factors which may be considered and is not exhaustive. Id.
30. Id. See supra note 29.




"compares the sentences imposed for the commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.""3 Here Justice Powell noted the capi-
tal punishment tests of proportionality" and the non-capital pro-
portionality review in Weems v. United States where the Court
had mentioned that the sentence under federal law was only two
years imprisonment as opposed to the fifteen years imprisonment
given to the defendant.3"
In discussing a court's ability to compare sentences within and
without the same jurisdiction, Justice Powell stated that while it is
difficult, not in comparing years but in ascertaining when the line
of an eighth amendment violation is crossed, it is not impossible. 6
Justice Powell made an analogy to the sixth amendment where
such lines must be drawn in tests concerning the rights to a speedy
trial and trial by jury. In determining the right to a speedy trial,
he explained, the court should consider objective factors and the
particular circumstances of the case.38 In deciding when a defen-
dant has a right to trial by jury, Justice Powell noted, that the
Court had set the line at any case where the defendant could be
imprisoned for more than six months. 89 The six month line was
drawn by examining the time limits used'by jurisdictions through-
out the country. 0
After stating the proportionality test, the majority applied the
test to the case at hand. In comparing the severity of the crime and
the harshness of the penalty, the majority stressed the small
amount of money involved in the "no account" check, the non-vio-
lence of the defendant's seven felony convictions"1 and that, bar-
33. Id.
34. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). Justice Powell quoted from En-
mund that "only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant
(such as Enmund) to be sentenced to die." 103 S. Ct. at 3010 (quoting 102 S. Ct. at 3374).
Justice Powell also referred to Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (the Court, in consider-
ing the imposition of the death penalty for rape, in absence of murder, found it significant
that only a minority of the states in the country authorized the death penalty for the crime).
103 S. Ct. at 3010.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 3010. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910).
36. 103 S. Ct. at 3012.
37. Id.
38. Id. Some of the factors a court is to use in determining if the defendant has been
denied the right to a speedy trial are "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defen-
dant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 3012 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)).
40. 103 S. Ct. at 3012.
41. Id. at 3012-13.
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ring a remote possibility of executive clemency,42 Helm had re-
ceived the most severe penalty authorized by South Dakota
statutory law for any crime.' In discussing sentences imposed on
other criminals in South Dakota, the majority relied primarily on
South Dakota crimes of third offense heroin dealing and aggra-
vated assault, neither of which authorized a life sentence." Third,
in comparing Helm's sentence to sentences imposed in other states
which had recidivist statutes, only one other state, Nevada, al-
lowed for a penalty of life without parole."5
Justice Powell, at this point, confronted the Court's decision in
Rummel, which upheld the sentence of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole mandated by Texas' recidivist statute.46 South
Dakota had argued that, under its statute, Helm did have a possi-
bility of receiving a commutation by the governor of South Dakota
which would reduce the life sentence to a fixed term of years.'
Justice Powell rejected this argument and pointed to the Court's
ability in Rummel to be virtually certain that Rummel would most
likely receive parole within the state's average of twelve years.48
Justice Powell concluded that the chances of Helm being paroled
were too remote and uncertain to be relied upon or compared with
the Texas system of parole in Rummel.49 The sentence of life with-
out parole under the South Dakota statute was therefore deemed
unconstitutional. 50
42. Id. at 3013, 3016 n.29. The Court was referring to the fact that a life sentence had
last been commuted in 1975 and that Helm had already been turned down. Brief for Appel-
lant at 26-29, Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). For a list of paroles considered and
their disposition, see affidavit by Ben Dearduff, Legal Liason of the South Dakota State
Penitentiary, in Solem v. Helm, Joint Appendix to Petitioner and Respondent Briefs (Dec.
23, 1982).
43. 103 S. Ct. at 3013-14. Murder required a life sentence without the possibility of
parole, there being no death penalty in South Dakota. Other first offenses allowing a court
to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the majority explained, were trea-
son, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping. Id.
44. Id. at 3014.
45. Id. The Court noted that it was not aware of Nevada's ever having imposed the
life without parole sentence on a defendant whose crimes were as "minor" as Helm's. Id.
46. Id. at 3015.
47. Id. See Brief for Petitioner at 22, Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16. Justice Powell also cited two opinions written by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, who authored the dissent in the present case. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) Chief Justice Burger is quoted: "Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clem-
ency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." Id. at 477.
A similar distinction is made by the Chief Justice in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dum-
schat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981).




Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion, attacked the ma-
jority opinion on three grounds: stare decisis, proportionality re-
view and intrusion upon the legislature's territory.5' Chief Justice
Burger contended that proportionality review regarding solely the
length of sentences is something that not only was rejected in
Rummel but which also has been rejected historically by the
Court.5 ' He dismissed Weems as a decision in which the Court had
not dealt solely with the length of the sentence but also with the
physical manner in which it was carried out."3
In Rummel, Chief Justice Burger submitted, the Court specifi-
cally rejected each part of the three-pronged proportionality test."
He stated that the test was rejected because of the subjectivity
necessarily involved:6" the sentences received in other states are
too difficult to compare6--especially when dealing with the habit-
ual offender statutes-and the weighing of sentences imposed by a
state against other criminals within the same state for different
crimes infringes on the policy-creating capacity of the state's
legislature.57
Chief Justice Burger, in arguing that stare decisis required the
Court to once again reject the proportionality test, explained why
Rummel and the present case were not substantially distinguisha-
ble." The Chief Justice noted that the defendant in Rummel had
committed three non-violent crimes while in Helm the three bur-
glaries and driving while intoxicated were in essence violent.5'
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the crimes committed by Helm
were violent because of the risk potential involved.60 He also took
exception with the majority's distinguishing between life sentences
with and without parole." Chief Justice Burger stated that since
1964, of forty-seven requests for commutation in South Dakota,
twenty-two life sentences were commuted to a term of years while
twenty-five requests were denied.61 He concluded from this that
51. Id. at 3017-2f (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 3018 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. See supra note 24.
54. 103 S.Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id. Here Chief Justice Burger referred to the possible differences in importance
placed on sentencing horse thieves in Texas as opposed to Rhode Island or Washington. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3019-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 3022-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. A discrepancy between the commutation statistics of the majority and dissent-
1984 1075
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Helm had a "significant probability" of being released early.6 3
Finally, Chief Justice Burger stated throughout his dissenting
opinion his belief that the Court was intruding upon legislative ter-
ritory in dealing with proportionality review.4 In determining sen-
tencing, he believed that the state legislatures are better suited to
deal with the balancing of interests, both personal and public,
when drawing the necessarily arbitrary lines required for sentenc-
ing guidelines."'
All of these arguments led Chief Justice Burger to conclude that
if the country is to be ultimately guided by the law as set forth in
Rummel, then Rummel must be followed and proportionality re-
view of criminal sentences must be kept out of the hands of the
various appellate courts.6
The road to the Court's holding in Solem v. Helm,67 that the
length of a criminal sentence could be so disproportionate to the
offense as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, began in
the 1892 dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont.5 Although the issue was
not raised in O'Neil's appeal to the Supreme Court,69 dissenting
Justice Field wrote that the eighth amendment could be, and was,
violated when O'Neil was sentenced to fifty-four years for 307 of-
fenses involving the sale of intoxicating liquors in violation of Ver-
mont law.70 Justice Field raised the idea that the eighth amend-
ment could apply to sentences which, solely in terms of length,
were disproportionate to the offense committed.7
The idea of disproportionate sentencing in non-capital cases was
adopted by a majority of the Court in Weems v. United States.2
ing opinions existed in that the majority opinion stated that 35, not 25, requests were de-
nied. See id. at 3016 n.29.
63. Id. at 3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 3017-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1982).
68. 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 331. The issue of a violation of the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution was raised by the defendant in the state court but he failed to assign it as error
to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court consequently did not decide the issue.
Id.
70. Id. at 337-39 (Field, J., dissenting). The defendant was a New York wholesaler and
retailer of liquor who mailed out 307 orders to Vermont residents over a three year period.
He was also fined $6,638.72. Id.
71. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field, in a famous quote, noted that
the eighth amendment can be directed "against all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id.
72. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court stated that "punishment for crime should be grad-
1076 Vol. 22:1069
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The Court in Weems discussed the disproportionality to the crime
of the punishment received, as involving more than simply the
length of the sentence. 3 The Court, however, did quote from a Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision 7  which raised the
possibility that the length of a sentence alone could be sufficiently
disproportionate so as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
75
After these early twentieth century decisions, the Supreme
Court was relatively silent76 on the issue of proportionality review
of non-capital sentencing until the late 1950's and the early 1960's
when Trop v. Dulles7 7 and Robinson v. California78 were decided.
Neither of those cases, although finding the non-capital sentence
to be in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, re-
lied on the length of the sentence as being the cause of the eighth
uated and proportioned to the offense." Id. at 367. It was, however, ultimately held that the
length of the particular sentence dealt with did not matter since the law itself was unconsti-
tutional as violative of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 382.
73. Id. at 366.
74. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 328, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899) (defen-
dant convicted of forging and offering checks was sentenced to 25 years under Massachu-
setts recidivist statute).
75. 217 U.S. at 368. The Court quoted from a discussion by the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court about the Massachusetts Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment
clause which was virtually identical to the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
The Massachusetts clause stated "no magistrate or court of law shall . .. inflict cruel or
unusual punishments." MASS. CONST. art. XXVI. The eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution did not apply to the states at this time. See In re Kemler, 136 U.S. 436,
446 (1890).
Seven years after Weems was decided, the Court, in Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
391 (1916) held that it was not cruel and unusual punishment for a defendant to be con-
victed and sentenced for seven counts of mail fraud, one conviction and sentence for each of
the seven letters mailed in his scheme to defraud. The sentence for each count was five
years imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently.
Id. at 393.
76. There were several other cases touching upon proportionality review but they dealt
with cruel and unusual punishment in terms of state law because the eighth amendment
could not yet reach the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Howard v. Fleming,
191 U.S. 126 (1907). See also Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) in which the
defendant received life imprisonment under the West Virginia recidivist statute. There were
two convictions; one for stealing two horses worth $125 and the other for attempting to steal
one horse worth $100. The Court noted "[nior can it be maintained that cruel and unusual
punishment was inflicted." Id. at 631.
The Supreme Court in Rummel quoted the Graham Court in an attempt to show that the
Court had already dealt with Rummel's eighth amendment challenge. Rummel, 445 U.S. at
276. The Rummel Court, however, had to deal with the fact that the eighth amendment did
not apply to the states at that time. It argued that its earlier cases had assumed that the
states were not allowed to inflict punishments that were cruel and unusual. Id. at 277 n.13.
77. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
78. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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amendment violation. 9 In Trop, the Court found denationalization
to be barred per se by the eighth amendment.80 The Court stated
that its prior interpretation of the eighth amendment was never
intended to be set in cement, and that as the standards of decency
set by society advance naturally, so too must the Court's interpre-
tation of the eighth amendment be allowed to mature.81 The
Robinson Court found it cruel and unusual punishment for a per-
son to be convicted of being addicted to narcotics.82
Throughout the 1970's, there was a growing acceptance in the
federal courts of the idea of proportionality review in non-capital
sentencing.s Ultimately, the most significant of these cases" was
Hart v. Coiner,8 5 where the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit struck down a mandatory life sentence given to the
defendant who had been convicted under West Virginia's recidivist
79. 356 U.S. at 102; 370 U.S. at 667.
80. 356 U.S. at 101. Trop was convicted in a court martial for desertion in 1944 during
World War II while stationed in Morocco, sentenced to serve three years at hard labor and
dishonorably discharged. Trop lost his citizenship because of the conviction and dishonora-
ble discharge for desertion during wartime as per section 401(g) of The Nationality Act of
1940. Id.* at 87-88.
81. Id. at 100-01.
82. 370 U.S. at 667. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, made a general state-
ment that a punishment disproportionate to the offense might bring it under the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the eighth amendment. Id. at 676 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
83. Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978). Judge Mulligan, writing for the
majority, cited several cases in support of this point. Id. at 408.
84. See, e.g., Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1979) (conviction for possession of
drugs in an automobile, with a 15 year to life sentence, was not excessively disproportionate,
especially in light of the drug trafficking problems which faced the state of New York);
Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975) (defendant
received a life sentence under a West Virginia recidivist statute after convictions of bur-
glary, breaking and entering, and grand larceny, which were seen by the court as more seri-
ous than the crimes in Hart, and therefore the life sentence did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment); Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded,
423 U.S. 993 (1975) (defendant's conviction of both possession and sale of marijuana and
sentence of 10-20 years on the first charge and 20-40 years on the second was cruel and
unusual punishment in light of the nature of the offense and comparisons with other state
offenses); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974)
(petition for writ of certiorari untimely filed); Ralph v. Warden of the Maryland Peniten-
tiary, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1971) (convicted rapist's
sentence of death was held disproportionate because the victim's life was not taken or put in
,danger); United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970) (an 18-year-old draft
resister's maximum sentence of five years was excessive and disproportionate to the offense,
especially in light of his willingness to serve as a conscientious objector, although the eighth
amendment was not specifically mentioned).
85. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
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statute.8 6 The court of appeals, in so deciding, stated that the
mandatory life sentence was disproportionate and thus a violation
of the eighth amendment as applied to the Hart facts.8 7 There the
court of appeals established a four-pronged objective test of dis-
proportionality,88 of which three of the criteria were ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court in Solem.89 The four criteria used
by the Fourth Circuit were: the nature and gravity of the offense, 90
the legislative purpose behind the statute,91 the punishment for
the same crime in other jurisdictions, 2 and how the punishment
compared to the punishments for other crimes in the same
jurisdiction."3
The Supreme Court decided in Rummel v. Estelle,94 to confront
head-on the issue of disproportionality of felony sentencing in non-
capital cases.95 The Rummel Court held that a Texas recidivist
statute which mandated life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole was not in violation of the eighth amendment clause forbid-
ding cruel and unusual punishment. 96 Rummel's three felony con-
victions for theft and theft-related offenses, which triggered the re-
cidivist statute, involved a total of $229." In striking down the
challenge to the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Court
looked at the four objective criteria proposed by Rummel, which
had been applied earlier in Hart.98 In its examination of the nature
and gravity of the offense, the Court noted both that violence, or
the lack thereof, did not always affect the interests of society in
deterrence of the offense and that the amount of money stolen in-
volved an analysis which was prone to subjectivity and therefore a
matter for the legislature. 9  In examining how criminals were pun-
ished for similar crimes in other jurisdictions, the Rummel Court
86. Id. at 143.
87. Id. Hart was convicted under West Virginia's recidivist statute after convictions
for writing a bad check for $50, taking forged checks worth $140 across state lines, and
committing perjury at his son's murder trial. He received a mandatory life imprisonment
sentence. Id. at 138.
88. Id. at 140-42.
89. See Solem v. Helm 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010-11 (1983).
90. 483 F.2d at 140.
91. Id. at 141.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 142.
94. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
95. Id. at 264-85.
96. Id. at 285.
97. Id. at 265-66.
98. Id. 275-76, 282.
99. Id. at 275.
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stated that a comparison of recidivist statutes is a task too com-
plex to be done properly.100 A more general comparison with pun-
ishments in other jurisdictions, was also rejected by the Rummel
Court, which pointed out that rational people can have valid dis-
agreements as to the merits in punishing crimes of one type in a
harsher manner than others. 01 On its face, Rummel might have
been seen as bringing a virtual end to eighth amendment propor-
tionality review of sentencing in non-capital cases, an interpreta-
tion vigorously adhered to by the federal courts."0 2
If there was any lingering doubt or resistance among the lower
courts, and no doubt there was at least some in 'the Fourth Circuit,
the Supreme Court set out in Hutto v. Davis'"' to deal with this
reticence. 0 4 Davis was given a sentence of forty years imprison-
ment and a $20,000 fine for his conviction on two counts of posses-
sion of less than nine ounces of marijuana.'05 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the punishment
was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation
of the eighth amendment.' The Supreme Court then vacated and
100. 445 U.S. 263, 279-81. Rummel claimed that Texas was less lenient regarding its
recidivist statute than were all other states. The Court, in discussing the complexity in-
volved in ascertaining the leniency of any particular state's recidivist statute, mentioned
that the factors involved in triggering recidivist statutes may vary as to the number of felo-
nies, the fact that some are mandatory while others rely on judge or jury discretion and
some require "violent" felonies while some do not. Also, adding to complexity in compari-
sons is that prosecutors can, in many cases, exercise their discretion to invoke a recidivist
statute in order to "screen out 'petty' offenders who fall within the literal terms of such
statutes." Id.
101. Id. at 282 n.27.
102. For several decisions which used Rummel to deny an eighth amendment cruel
and unusual punishment challenge, see United States v. Compton, 704 F.2d 739, 742 (5th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86, 93 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Schell,
692 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1982); Fowler v. Parrott, 682 F.2d 746, 758 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Dazzo, 672 F.2d 284, 290 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Fleming, 671 F.2d 1002,
1003 n.1 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1980);
Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 1982); Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1980); McLaren v. Fairman, 532 F. Supp. 60, 62-63 (N.D.
1M. 1982); Cassesse v. New York, 530 F. Supp. 694, 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). But see Terrebone
v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir.), vacated panel opinion to consider en banc, 646
F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981) (special panel interpreted Rummel as not striking down pro-
portionality review, however, the court sitting en banc vacated the panel opinion and
pointed out that Rummel rejected the four-pronged proportionality test).
103. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
104. Id. at 374-75. The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, referred to
the court of appeals as having "failed to heed fits] decision in Rummel." Id. at 372.
105. Id. at 371. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years and a $10,000 fine for each
count, with the sentences of imprisonment to run consecutively. Id.
106. Id. at 372. In a panel decision, the court of appeals held in Davis v. Davis, 585
F.2d 1226, 1229 (4th Cir. 1978), that the defendant had not shown that the sentence vio-
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remanded the case to the court of appeals to reconsider in light of
Rummel.10 7 The court of appeals again affirmed the district court's
holding of cruel and unusual punishment.108 This prompted the
Supreme Court in Hutto to state that it had recognized the four-
part Hart test and had consciously disapproved of all the "objec-
tive" factors set forth in Hart.10 9 The Hutto Court then went on to
reiterate what the Rummel Court had said-that proportionality
review of sentencing could be accomplished in exceedingly rare
cases. 110 Justice Powell, who was to write the majority opinion in
Solem,"' wrote an opinion, in Hutto, concurring in the judgment,
in which he emphasized that the Rummel Court had not rejected
proportionality analysis of sentencing,112 though he noted that the
Rummel decision did severely limit appellate review of sentences
that could be considered cruel and unusual.' Justice Powell fur-
ther stated in Hutto that while arguably Davis' sentence could be
seen as cruel and unusual punishment, he felt constrained to con-
cur in the result, mainly because of his belief that Rummel's of-
fenses were less serious than those of Davis.'
1 4
While the Supreme Court in Solem went one step further by es-
tablishing proportionality of sentencing review in non-capital
cases, the ultimate effect of the Solem decision is, at least for the
time being, in some doubt. The three-part proportionality test is,
for now, almost seen as mandatory-a conclusion one can draw
from the response by the lower federal courts and the state courts
in the short time following the decision. In the four months follow-
ing the Solem decision, at least eight federal and state courts made
at least a cursory examination of sentences in light of the Solem
decision." 5 In one of these cases, a New Jersey intermediate court
lated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 454 U.S. at 372. The court of appeals then,
sitting en banc on rehearing, held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments had been
violated. Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979).
107. 454 U.S. 370, 372 (1982) (citing Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980)).
108. 454 U.S. at 372.
109. Id. at 373 n.2.
110. Id. at 374.
111. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1982).
112. 454 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. See Marrero v. Wainwright, 103 S. Ct. 3567 (1983) (writ of certiorari granted,
judgment vacated and case remanded to the Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit for
further consideration in light of Solem); United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir.
1983) (defendant, convicted on 39 various counts arising from his involvement in drug
smuggling and sentenced to 210 years, was, however, eligible for parole after 10 years, which
the court used to distinguish this case from Solem, id. at 1335, 1340-41 n.2); Schwartziniller
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found the sentence of interdiction " 6 in a criminal anti-trust case to
be a violation of the eighth amendment under the Solem test.11 7
Also, in Marrero v. Wainwright," ' the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, vacated judgment, and remanded to the court of appeals
for consideration in light of Solem. "9
Even though there now exists a three-part proportionality test,
there are still aspects of the test which appear to be unclear. One
of the general problems with the application of the test, noted by
Chief Justice Burger in his Solem dissent, is whether all three cri-
teria must exist and how they are to be weighed against one an-
other.12 0 The majority in Solem referred only to a "combination"
of factors needed to perform a proportionality analysis,12 1 and al-
though the Solem majority found all three factors to be relevant,12 2
they never stated whether this was a necessity.
1 23
Also, there appear to be several possible definitional problems
which are likely to arise in the future regarding the specific crite-
ria. The majority opinion in Solem discussed the seriousness of the
crimes yet seemed to discuss seriousness in terms of what actually
v. Gardner, 567 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Idaho 1983) (applying the three-part test for defendant
who was given a minimum sentence of 11 years and 8 months for lewd and lascivious con-
duct with a minor); Weaver v. State, 437 So.2d 626 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (defendant re-
ceived 221/2 years for theft of property and 10 years for escape, and although an eighth
amendment issue was not raised, the court gave it a cursory examination); Minor v. State,
437 So.2d 651 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (defendant received life without parole under Alabama
recidivist statute and court examined the eighth amendment issue finding the sentence not
to be disproportionate); Jackson v. State, 440 So.2d 1181, 1184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (de-
fendant, on conviction of his fourth felony, received 15 years under recidivist statute, the
court said, on its own initiative, that this did not violate the eighth amendment); State v.
New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 191 N.J. Super. 144, 465 A.2d 596 (1983) (the court found
the sentence of interdict was disproportionate in light of the three-part Solem test); State v.
Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 668 P.2d 313 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). But see United States v.
DeBright, 710 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1983) where 53-year-old mother who was convicted on
four counts involving drug trafficking violations received four six-year sentences to run con-
currently. The court held that while it could consider an eighth amendment claim of dispro-
portionate sentencing, DeBright did not raise such a claim so it was not considered by the
court. Id. at 1409 n.8.
116. State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 191 N.J. Super. 144, 465 A.2d 596 (1983)
(the interdict imposed on the defendants prohibited them, upon a first offense misdemeanor
conviction, from ever again participating in a New Jersey business). Id. at 597-98, 603.
117. Id. The defendants unreasonably restrained "the business of providing garbage
collection service to customers in the relevant area." Id. at 597.
118. 103 S. Ct. 3567 (1983).
119. Id.
120. 103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 3010 n.17.
122. Id. at 3012-16.
123. Id. at 3010-11 and at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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happened.124 In contrast, Chief Justice Burger raised what he
called the "harsh potentialities for violence."125 One might wonder
if, in assessing the seriousness of the crime, a court ought to take
into account what the legislature had in mind when making the
offense a crime and not simply whether the actual result of the
crime was violent in the particular case. Comparisons with other
jurisdictions might also encounter several problems. First, Chief
Justice Burger raised the hypothetical that several jurisdictions
may punish severely a crime which'the particular reviewing court
sees as rather minor. 126 Furthermore, the Court in Rummel found
that recidivist statutes were too complex to deal with objec-
tively.1 2 7 It is unlikely, however, that a state can circumvent an
eighth amendment proportionality analysis by designing punish-
ments which due to a complex nature would make impossible a
comparison with crimes outside as well as inside of the state.
There is also a question regarding whether the Solem propor-
tionality analysis will ultimately be applied narrowly or broadly. In
the most immediate future, it would seem that the Solem test will
have a rather narrow effect within its application. 2 8 First, there is
the qualification that eighth amendment proportionality review
will be found only in "exceedingly rare" cases, a qualification that
has been echoed since Weems and is present in the three most re-
cent cases-Rummel, Hutto and Solem. 29 Eventually, the Court
will have to define what "exceedingly rare" means in terms more
definitional than the extreme example of felony overtime parking
cited in Rummel.5 0 It could be that only by finding an eighth
amendment violation, such as life imprisonment without parole in
the present case, will definable boundaries in sentencing be estab-
lished. One lower court has already used "exceedingly rare" to
keep the effect of Solem narrow. 81 Finally, the narrowness of the
majorities in Rummel and Solem, both 5-4 decisions, seems to sug-
124. 103 S. Ct. at 3013.
125. 103 S. Ct. at 3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger raised the point
that the crimes could have been violent if there had been a guard at the scene of the burgla-
ries or if someone had been killed as a result of Helm's drunk driving. Id.
126. Id. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. See supra note 102.
128. See supra note 118.
129. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374; Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
130. See 445 U.S. at 274 n.11. The Court conceded that if the legislature made over-
time parking a felony punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment it might be subject to
proportionality analysis. Id.
131. See Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 567 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Idaho 1983).
1984 1083
Duquesne Law Review
gest that the Court might not take an expansive view of the case.
This is not to say that ultimately the Court will not expand the
application of the Solem test. The majority in Solem did, after all,
point out that the list of factors to be considered was not exhaus-
tive.1 32 If the Solem decision is to have a wide application and ef-
fect on sentencing, it would seem in the final analysis to rely on
the idea put forth by Justice Rehnquist in Rummel.'" There Jus-
tice Rehnquist raised the point that the interpretation of the
eighth amendment will rely on as yet evolving standards of de-
cency and purpose. 184 This would depend then on what society will
ultimately demand. Society could demand that more concern be
given to the victim rather than the criminal, thus further reducing
the ultimate effect of Solem. On the other hand, society might be-
come more concerned with the criminal and the effect of Solem
would then be expanded. The road to Solem and proportionality
analysis of sentencing in non-capital cases was a slow process.13 5 As
to what path the Court will follow in the future, to quote Justice
Rehnquist, "we have no way of knowing in which direction that
road lies."'3 6
Russell K. Broman
132. 103 S. Ct. at 3011.
133. See 445 U.S. at 283-84.
134. See id. at 283.
135. See 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
136. See 445 U.S. at 283.
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